Bulow and Klemperer's theorem [1] is a fundamental result in the auction literature, drawing a connection between two basic auctions for selling a single item. The second price auction, also known as the Vickrey auction [5] , lets the highest bidder win the item at the price of the second highest bid. It always sells to the highest bidder, thereby maximizing the market's efficiency, requires no prior information, and is easy to implement in practice. On the other hand, revenue optimal auctions, those that generate the most revenue for the auctioneer, are usually more intricate. They may sometimes not sell to anyone, or sell to a bidder who does not place the highest bid, and their rules in general depend on prior information on bidders' values [3] . Bulow and Klemperer showed that, in the case where bidders' values are drawn independently and identically from a distribution that satisfies a commonly assumed regularity property, the simple Vickrey auction with n + 1 bidders extracts no less revenue than the revenue optimal auction with n bidders, for any n ≥ 1. This fundamental result makes an elegant comparison between the revenue impact brought by enhanced competition and that attributed to more precise market information and tailored auction design. It holds for a large family of distributions, as long as the bidders' values are i.i.d. drawn.
Hartline and Roughgarden [2] , in their seminal work that started a fruitful line of research on the revenue of simple auctions (as exemplified by the Vickrey auction), extended Bulow and Klemperer's result, with approximation, to auctions where bidders' values are drawn independently but not identically from regular distributions. This extension is approximate for two changes it makes in the comparison between the two auctions. First, the Vickrey auction, instead of recruiting only one additional bidder, is now allowed to recruit n additional bidders (called duplicates), one from each distribution. Second, the revenue of this Vickrey auction with n duplicates, instead of being lower bounded by the optimal revenue without duplicates, is shown to be at least half as much. Bidders with different value distributions are often interpreted as coming from different populations or possessing different characteristics. Under this interpretation, the Vickrey auction is shown to approximate the optimal revenue if one is allowed to recruit at least one additional bidder from each population. Hartline and Roughgarden also gave an example with two bidders where the Vickrey auction, with two duplicate bidders, one from each distribution, extracts 3/4 of the revenue of the optimal auction without duplicates.
The two changes made in Hartline and Roughgarden's result leave two gaps between the behavior of auctions with i.i.d. bidders and those with independent but non-identical ones. The first gap is a necessary one: Hartline and Roughgarden's example shows that, absent symmetry among bidders, a constant fraction of revenue has to be lost by using the simpler Vickrey auction, even when all bidders are duplicated. The other gap has been an open question: how many duplicate bidders are needed for the Vickrey auction to give a constant approximation to the optimal revenue? Whereas for the i.i.d. case a single duplicate bidder suffices, it has remained unknown whether n duplicates are necessary when the value distributions are not identical.
Vickrey auction with a single duplicate. In this work, we close this second gap. We show that, in a single-item auction with n bidders, whose values are drawn independently from possibly different regular distributions, the Vickrey auction with one additional bidder with value drawn from one of the existing distributions obtains at least 1 10 of the optimal revenue extractable from the original bidders. 1 Therefore, the number of duplicate bidders needed in the non-i.i.d. setting is in fact no more than in the i.i.d. setting, if one is content with a constant approximation.
The main idea is that if either (a) some bidder bids high with constant probability (a bid is "high" if it is a constant fraction of the optimal revenue) or (b) the sum of the individual bidders' probabilities of bidding high is large, then VCG with a carefully chosen duplicate yields a constant approximation of the optimal revenue. We show, in fact, that any set of regular distributions must satisfy either (a) or (b).
Vickrey auction for k-items auctions with unit demand auctions. We extend our results to auctions with k identical items and n unit demand bidders. Here, we show that duplicating k bidders suffice for VCG to obtain a constant fraction of the optimal revenue.
Tighter analysis of the Vickrey auction with n duplicates. Since Hartline and Roughgarden first gave the upper bound of 2 and lower bound of 4 3 on the approximation factor of the Vickrey auction with n duplicates, it has remained open what this factor is in the worst case. We make progress towards resolving this by showing that for n = 2, 4 3 is the tight bound. We first give an alternate proof of Hartline and Roughgarden's original 2-approximation. Our proof uses the geometry of the so-called revenue curves and lower bounds the revenue of the Vickrey auction with n duplicates by that of Ronen's lookahead auction [4] , which is known to 2-approximate the optimal revenue. We then further exploit properties of the Vickrey auction and also switch to a stronger benchmark, the so-called ex ante optimal revenue. This allows us to identify a small family of distributions as worst scenarios; a thorough analysis of these reveals the tight ratio of 4 3 . The full version of the paper is available at: https://arxiv.org/abs/1905.03773
